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TOWARD A COHERENT
INTERPRETATION OF MAINE'S MARITAL
PROPERTY ACT
John C. Sheldon*
I. INTRODUCTION

Interpreted literally, Maine's Marital Property Act (MPA)1 ex* Judge, Maine District Court. I extend my sincere thanks to the Honorable D.
Brock Homby, Judge of the United States District Court of Maine, for his many
insightful comments on the arguments I make in this article. I also thank my brother,
Dr. Frederick H. Sheldon, of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia, for
his help on the mercurial scientific method.
1. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981 & Supp. 1990). The statute reads in
its entirety.
1. Disposition. In a proceeding: (a) for a divorce, (b) for legal separation, or (c) for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage
by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or
lacked jurisdiction to dispose of said property, the court shall set apart to
each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors,
including-.
A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker,
B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the
family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse
having custody of any children.
2. Definition. For purposes of this section only, "marital property"
means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,
exceptA. Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
B. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or
descent;
C. Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
D. Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
E. The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
3. Acquired subsequent to marriage. All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety and community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that
the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection 2.
4. Disposition of marital property. If both parties to a divorce action also request the court in writing to order disposition of marital property acquired by either or both of the parties to the divorce prior to January 1, 1972, or nonmarital property owned by the parties to the divorce
action, the court shall also order such disposition in accordance with subsection 1.
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cludes all wedding gifts from the marital estates of divorcing
spouses. Wedding gifts received before a wedding are nonmarital because they were not received during the marriage.2 Wedding gifts
received after a wedding are nonmarital because they were gifts,
which appear to be expressly excluded from the marital estate by
the statute's definition of marital property.$ In short, a literal reading of the MPA prevents Maine's divorce courts from exercising any
discretion in the distribution of what must, by any measure4 of common sense, be quintessential examples of marital property.
This curious state of affairs is the product of inadequate draftsmanship of § 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act5
(UMDA), of which § 722-A(1) of the MPA is virtually the verbatim
derivative.' While those deficiencies have drawn plenty of fire from
within and without Maine,7 it is not the purpose of this article to
5. Decree content. If the final divorce decree disposes of real property,

it shall name the party or parties responsible for preparing and recording
the decree of divorce or abstract thereof and paying the recording fee. The
decree may name different parties to be responsible for different parcels.
6. Omitted property. If a final divorce decree fails to set apart or divide marital property over which the court had jurisdiction, the omitted
property is deemed held by both parties as tenants in common. On the motion of either party, which may be made at any time, the court may set
aside or divide the omitted property between the parties, as justice may
require.
2. Id. Section 722-A(1) and (2), in combination, permit a divorce court to "divide
the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just" but then limit the
definition of "marital property" to property "acquired by either spouse subsequent to
the marriage."
3. Id. Section 722-A(1) and (2)(A), in combination, authorize the divorce court to
exercise discretion in dividing marital property, but then exclude from the definition
of "marital property" property received by gift.
4. See Note, Gifts, Joint Ownership, and Marital Property: Interspousal Transfers of Property Under Maine's Marital Property Act, 38 MAiNE L. R-v. 263, 270
(1986):
If the statutory definition-which explicitly excludes both inherited and
gift property from the definition of marital property-is read literally by
the court, then it might exclude all such property from the judicially divisible estate, even if that property had been deeded to both spouses in some
form of joint ownership during the marriage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5. UbrH. MARMGE AND DIvoRcE AcT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238-39.
6. Section 722-A(1) of the MPA differs substantively from the UMDA only "in
that it omits the phrase 'without regard to marital misconduct.'" Boyd v. Boyd, 421
A.2d 1356, 1357 (Me. 1980).
7. "[T]he lack of clarity in the drafting makes textual analysis a tenuous basis for
discerning the meaning of the statute." Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139, 144 n.1 (Me.
1981) (Glassman, J., concurring). Commenting on a virtually identical Illinois statute,
Professor William Gregory has noted that:
[t]he Illinois Supreme Court faces a difficult task as it begins to clarify the
language of the [Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act] concerning the distribution of property. The efforts so far have been promising,
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add to that literature. Instead, this article treats the MIPA as a fait
accompli: the Legislature chose to adopt it years ago, 8 and has
scarcely changed any of its principal provisions since,0 so it is proba-

bly here to stay. The challenge, then, is not to criticize it but to
work with it: to advance its apparent objectives without stumbling
over its many idiosyncrasies.
This article attempts to resolve the problem of one of those idiosyncrasies. First, the article focuses on the narrow question of wedding gifts in an effort to identify an interpretation of the MPA that
permits a reasonable solution to that problem that is compatible at
least with the spirit of the statute. 10 Such an interpretation is available. The statute may be construed as giving trial judges authority to
determine what should and should not be marital property, thereby
granting them the flexibility to avoid results that offend common
sense. Having described this interpretation of the MPA, the article
then compares it with appellate case law precedent to determine
whether there is case law authority for it.11
although many areas of the Act are still unclear....
*. . It seems unfortunate that the common-law method of filling in the
details of statutes places such an extreme burden on the litigants.
Gregory, Marital Property in Illinois: The Complexities Wrought by the Presumption of Gift, Transmutation,and Commingling, 1982 S. ILL U.L.J. 159, 191-92 (1982).
When the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act draft of § 307 (which Maine adopted
as the MPA) was first proposed to the National Conference of Commirsioners on
Uniform State Laws, the delegates who reviewed it decided that, before it could be
adopted, the term "marital property" needed more definition. 1971 Midyear Report
and Recommendation of the Family Law Section to the ABA House of Delegates on
the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act, 5 FAm L.Q. 133, 179 (1971). In addition, the
idea of limiting "marital property" to property acquired after marriage, and the
scheme of exemptions from "marital property" for gifts, inheritances, and the lie
drew substantial fire. See Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, 7 FATn. L.Q. 169, 175 (1973). As a result, § 307 was substantially
redrafted, and the version adopted in 1973 omitted the "presumption" that has so
bedeviled the Law Court. See UNi. MI AGE AND Div0RcE AcT § 307; Tibbetts v.
Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979).
8. The MPA was adopted by the Maine Legislature as P.L. 1971, ch. 399, § 2
(effective January 1, 1972).
9. In 1972, M. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1) (1981) was amended to replace
the verb "may" in the phrase, "the court may set apart to each spouse his property
and may divide the marital property," with "shall." See J. LEvy. MANz Fsmuy LAw
7-38, n.143 (1988) [hereinafter LEvy]. A 1977 amendment added section 4 to the statute. A 1979 amendment added section 5 to the statute. In 1989 the Maine Legislature
added section 6 to the statute, which authorized divorce courts to dispose of property
omitted from the final divorce decree. See Ma Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981
& Supp. 1989).
10. "In interpreting a statute courts must presume that the Legislature did not
intend unreasonable or absurd consequences nor results inimical to the public interest." Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d 163, 166 (Me. 1980).
11. While I acknowledge that the approach of this article-positing a theory and
then testing it against existing case law-is unorthodox in the law review world, it is
not an unprecedented methodology. Rather, it is a rough approximation of the deduc-
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There is some case law directly on point, but none from Maine.
However, the relevant case law, even in Maine, implicitly and amply
demonstrates that the interpretation offered by this article is
needed, because the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's repeated efforts to interpret the MPA have failed to produce any consistent
results. That the court has been bravely battling to make sense of
the MPA for almost nineteen years, without victory so far and without reasonable hope for success in the foreseeable future, suggests
that it may be time to reinterpret the MPA.12
II.

WEDDING GIFTS RECEIVED BEFORE THE MARRIAGE

In its essential outline, the MPA defines the boundaries of a divorce court's discretion to divide up the property of divorcing
spouses. A divorce court has broad discretion to disperse what is
called "marital" property: any property "acquired by either spouse
subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation."' 3 Property declared to be marital may be distributed to either
party or to both parties in virtually any manner or proportion that
the divorce court4 chooses, subject only to the court's exercise of
sound discretion.1

tive scientific method. That method has been described this way.
What, then, can we use as a logically consistent methodology, and what
methodologies have been used by successful scientists in the past? The simple, yet compelling, answer to this question is: Develop a hypothesis and
test it, preferably by trying to show it is wrong rather than right. The emphasis is on the test rather than on the creation of the hypothesis....
...An idea of hypothesis cannot be confirmed'or verified, but it can be
falsified by showing it to be inconsistent with observation or experience.
When a hypothesis has been tested many times by unsuccessful efforts to
falsify it, [Karl] Popper would say it has been "corroborated." Actually, the
strength of such an analysis lies in the falsification of alternative hypotheses. The "corroborated" hypothesis is the one that remains unfalsified.
Gaffney, An Introduction to the Logic of Phylogeny Reconstruction, in J. CRAcRAFT
& N. ELDREDGE, PHYLOGENETIC ANALYsIs AND PALEONTOLOGY 81, 83 (1979). Obviously,
the methodology of this article differs from that described by Mr. Gaffney at least in
the respect that what falsification is attempted is of existing Maine Law Court precodent-someone else's hypothesis-rather than of my own. I use appellate precedent
from other jurisdictions to verify my hypothesis.
12. The MPA is not totally useless; in many cases it is adequate for the task of
directing the divorce court's exercise of or abstention from discretion. In particular
cases, however, the direction it gives does not make sense-as in wedding gifts-or is
ambiguous. See infra the text accompanying note 76. In the final analysis, the MPA
is like the Hubble space telescope: it often functions properly, but it has some weird
peculiarities.
13. ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(3) (1980).
14. See Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391 (Me. 1980); Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152
(Me. 1978). See also Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977) (court must at
least consider the three factors given by ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1)). For
the limits on the divorce court's discretion, see Robinson v. Robinson, 554 A.2d 1173
(Me. 1989) (abuse of discretion to consider the lifestyle that the spouses shared dur-
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A party seeking to prevent the divorce court's discretionary disposition of any of the parties' property acquired after marriage must
prove that such property is "nonmarital' '0 The MPA identifies a
variety of methods by which property may be acquired during a
marriage but remain nonmarital: property acquired by gift, devise or
inheritance; property acquired in exchange for property owned prior
to the marriage or in exchange for property obtained by gift, devise
or inheritance after the marriage; property acquired after legal separation; property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and the
increase in value of otherwise nonmarital property-all these are
deemed nonmarital.16 Upon satisfactory proof that any property is
nonmarital, the divorce court loses the authority to dispose of it at
the court's discretion,
but must "set [it] apart" to the spouse who
1
claims title to it. 7
The problem of wedding gifts that appears in the introduction to
this article provides a framework for a discussion of the impact of
these statutory provisions on divorcing parties and their property. A
party who opposes the divorce court's discretionary authority over
any wedding gift (for purposes of this discussion, I will call it a vase)
must show that it is nonmarital property. One way to do that is to
show that the vase was acquired before the marriage, since the MPA
limits the divorce court's discretionary authority to property obtained after the marriage. Hence, if a party can demonstrate that
the vase was received before the wedding, that party prevents the
divorce court from exercising any discretion over it.' e For example,
ing marriage in dividing marital property).
15. "A spouse seeking to overcome the presumption has the burden of proof on
the issue of identification. The presumption is overcome by a showing that the property [falls into one of the Act's nonmarital categories]." HANDBOOK OF THI NATIONAL
COssFamiCE OF CohihassioiNEs oF UNIaom STATS LAws § 307, Comment at 204
(1970) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. See also Cushman v. Cushman, 495 A.2d 330 (Me.
1985).
16. MP REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(A)-(E) (1980).
17. "Non-marital property must be set apart, and to the extent practicable, transferred to the spouse owning it without the court exercising any discretion." West v.
West, 550 A.2d 1132, 1133 (Me. 1988). See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me.
1979).

18. The MPA defines "marital property" as "all property acquired by either
spouse subsequent to the marriage," and then goes on to list some exceptions to the
definition that apply to property acquired after marriage. Mn. RI'v. STAT. AN. tit. 19,
§ 722-A(2) (1981). Thus the definition of "marital property" limits the MPA to postmarital acquisitions; pre-marital acquisitions are necessarily nonmarital.

It is not clear from the language of the MPA who has the burden of producing
evidence on the issue of when or how the property was obtained. Thus if neither
party introduces evidence to show when the vase was obtained, one cannot tell from
the statute itself whether the divorce court must declare it marital or nonmarital. In
my view, the party who seeks to invoke the power of the court in the first instance-here, the power to divide the property equitably-must generate the issue of
the court's power through the evidence.
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if the vase was deposited in the church lobby by latecomers who
arrived after the wedding ceremony began but just prior to the exchange of vows, it is not marital property despite all logic to the
contrary. 9
IH. WEDDING GIFTS RECEIVED AFTER THE MARRIAGE

It would make sense that wedding gifts deposited in the lobby after the exchange of vows should be deemed to be marital property,
but if one takes the MPA literally that is not so. The Act
"presumes" that property acquired during the marriage is marital.2 0
That "presumption" is rebuttable; a party who opposes the divorce
court's discretionary disposition of any of the spouses' post-marital
property may "overcome" the "presumption" with proof that the
property was acquired by one or more of the nonmarital methods
described above. 21 Returning again to the wedding gift illustration,
if a party can prove that the vase was a gift, that party prevails on
the argument that it is nonmarital even if it was received after the
marriage. This means that, all logic to the contrary notwithstanding,
if the vase was deposited in the church lobby at 22any time after the
exchange of vows, it is still noumarital property.
The party having the risk of nonpersuasion (under the pleadings or other
rules) is naturally the one upon whom first falls this duty of going forward
with evidence; because, since he wishes to have the jury act for him, and
since without any legal evidence at all they could properly take no action,
there is no need for the opponent to adduce evidence; and this duty thus
falls first upon the proponent (a term convenient for designating the party
having the risk of nonpersuasion).
9 J. WImoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2487, at 293 (rev. ed., 1981)

(footnotes omitted). From that point of view, therefore, it is up to the party who
asserts that the vase is marital to demonstrate that it was received after the marriage,
and until such a showing the property is automatically deemed nonmarital-or, at
least, the court has no discretionary authority over it. Thus, technically, the party
who wants to argue that the vase is nonmarital need do nothing until and unless the
other party suggests its marital character.
However, in the case of wedding gifts, common sense automatically suggests the
marital character of the property;, thus, as a function of common sense, the burden is
on the person who opposes declaring the property marital to make sure that the
factfinder understands that the property was obtained before the wedding. Thus, although the text of this Article is technically at odds with the statute on this point,
the text presents the problem as it can be expected to arise at trial,
19. This discussion assumes no issues of delivery and acceptance. See Brackett v.
Larrivee, 562 A.2d 138, 139 (Me. 1989), for the elements of inter vivos gifts.
20. "All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior
to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property ... ." ME. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(3).
21. "The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the
property was acquired by a method listed in subsection 2 [listing exceptions to martel property such as gifts, devises, etc.]." Id.
22. An argument can be made that a gift to both spouses during marriage is different from a gift to "either spouse," and therefore falls outside of the specific statu-
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As is evident from the foregoing discussion, under one interpretation of the MPA, proof that property was acquired by any
nonmarital method or from any nonmarital source is conclusive of
the issue of the court's discretion over the property: such proof absolutely cuts off such discretion.2 3 The explanation for this absolute
is twofold. First, the PA's definition of "marital property" appears
to compel the result that property like the vase, received after marriage, is nonmarital. Second, even if the statutory definitions do not
compel that result, the statute's "presumption" does. For reasons
that will appear as I proceed, it is best to examine the second issue-the statute's "presumption"-first.
IV.

THE "PRESUMPTION" THAT ISN'T

According to some authorities, the MPA's "presumption" is an evidentiary device controlled by the Rules of Evidence.2 ' That is, when
tory exception to marital property contained in § 722-A(2)(A). Although this argument is compelling, it was rejected by half of the Law Court in Grant v. Grant, 424
A.2d 139, 142-43 n.2 (Me. 1981) (separate opinion of Wernick, J.) (discussing Forsythe v. Forsythe, 558 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo. App. 1977)).
23. See Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d 257 (Me. 1990) ("Once (the wife] established
in the present case that she made the payments from her non-marital property, the
statutory presumption was overcome and the presiding justice was obligated to set
aside to her the non-marital portion of the equity.") Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
The court's cited authority for that conclusion is its decision in West v. West, 550
A.2d 1132 (Me. 1988), in which the court stated that "[n]on-marital property must be
set apart, and to the extent practicable, transferred to the spouse owning it without
the court exercising any discretion." Id. at 1133. However, Dubord'sreliance on West
is slightly off-center, because there is a subtle but important distinction between
what West said and what Dubord said it said. The point in West is that nonmarital
property is exempt from the discretionary power of the court. The point in Dubord,
on the other hand, is that (1) when the "presumption" is "overcome" the property
must be deemed nonmarital, and (2) nonmarital property is exempt from the discretionary power of the court. Dubord correctly relied on West for the second proposition, but not for the first.
Dubord is the first case in which the Law Court expressly stated that when the
"presumption" is "overcome" the property must be declared nonmarital. However, it
intimated that interpretation of the statute as early as 1974 in Young v. Young, 329
A.2d 386 (Me. 1974), when it reversed a divorce court's treatment of "$530.00 worth
of... newly purchased furniture." Id. at 391. The trial court had deemed all of the
parties' furniture "commingled" and marital, but the Law Court decided that an
identifiable portion of it had been acquired in exchange for the husband's pre-marriage property, and should have been set aside exclusively to him. By so ruling, the
court implicitly ruled that the trial court had no discretion over property as to which
the "presumption" had been "overcome."
24.

See LEVY, supra note 9.

As a civil presumption, the operation of the marital property presumption is governed by Rule 301 of the Maine Rules of Evidence.... Once it
has been demonstrated that a particular item of property was acquired during marriage, the property must be presumptively regarded by the trial
court to be marital property. Rule 301(a) shifts the burden of proof to the
opposing party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prop-
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the MPA talks about "presuming" that property is marital, it must
be referring to Rule of Evidence 301, which governs the operation of
presumptions in civil cases."
Rule 301 inexorably produces the absurd result described above.
Upon proof that the vase was received by newlyweds, the MPA attaches a marital tag to it. Under Rule 301, the opponent to the presumption must then persuade the judge that the vase was a gift.
Once the judge is convinced that the vase was obtained by a
nonmarital method, the party opposing the presumption has met his
or her burden of persuasion, the presumption has been rebutted,
2
and the judge must declare the property nonmarital. 0
If that result seems reasonable, then there is nothing wrong with
letting Rule 301 control such issues. But if, as has been suggested
above, that result is unsatisfactory, then it is necessary to look for
another interpretation of the MPA's "presumption." In other words,
if Rule 301 works an absurdity, it should play no part in litigation
under the MPA.
Actually, a close study of Rule 301 suggests that it has no role to
play under the MPA anyway. The Rule provides for the determination of one fact upon the proof of another: "a presumption imposes
on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that
the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. '2 7 What that bulletproof phraseology means is that one fact
may be used to prove the existence of another fact.25 Thus, for example, if someone proves that a letter was mailed after having been
erty was either not acquired during.marriage or was acquired by way of one
of the five exceptions to marital property established in subsections 722-A
(2)(A) through (E).
Id. at 7-18 (citations omitted). See also R FIELD & P. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE

69

(2d ed. 1987), listing § 722-A's "presumption" as one of the statutory presumptions

controlled by Rule 301.
25. M.R. Evid. 301(a) reads as follows:
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceeding[s], except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of
the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
26. This assumes the interpretation of the definitions in the MPA that the Law
Court has adopted. See Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d 257, 259 (Me. 1990), and infra
text accompanying notes 35-36.

27. M.R. Evid. 301(a).
28. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

300101] at 300-1:

There is a general consensus that the term "presumption" should only be
used to mean a procedural rule which requires the existence of fact B (presumed fact) to be assumed when fact A (basic fact) is established ....
See also M.R. Evid. 301 advisers' note, quoted in R. FIELD &P. MURRAY, supra note
24 at 49:
[T]he word presumption should be reserved for the convention that when a
designated fact... exists, another fact... must be taken to exist in the
absence of adequate rebuttal. It has that meaning in this rule.
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properly addressed and stamped, that person is deemed to have
proved that it was received by the addressee (unless the opponent
proves otherwise). 29 Proving the first fact relieves the person of having to provide additional evidence in support of the second-the
presumed-fact.
The MPA's "presumption," however, is a different kind of beast.
What the MPA "presumes" is not a fact at all, but a category: upon
proof that the vase was received after the wedding was over, it is
categorized as marital and falls into the divorce court's discretionary
hotchpot. To retrieve the vase from the hotchpot, a party must show
that it is specifically exempted. This arrangement is nothing more
than a rule, or norm, with specified exceptions. The fact that the
burden of proving an exception is assigned to the party who urges it
does not make the scheme an evidentiary presumption; it merely
means that somebody has to prove something to escape the operation of the general rule.3 0 And the fact that the MPA calls its
scheme a "presumption" means only that the drafters of the statute

were imprecise-not an uncommon occurrence. 31

29. R.FIr.nm & P. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 301.2 at 53, citing Greybar Electric
Co. v. Sawyer, 485 A.2d 1384 (Me. 1985); Perry v. Park St. Motor Corp., 127 Me. 365,
143 A. 274 (1928).
30. The Uniform Probate Code provides a scheme of assigning burdens of producing evidence and persuasion as to particular issues, without calling everything a "presumption." See Ma. REv.STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-407 (1981):
In contested cases, petitioners who seek to establish intestacy have the
burden of establishing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heirship. Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due
execution in all cases, and, if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of
death and venue. Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack
of testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake
or revocation. Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters
with respect to which they have the initial burden of proof.
Since § 3-407 does not provide that any fact or group of facts is prima facie evidence
of another fact or group of facts, its use of the term "prima fade" does not imply an
evidentiary presumption. See M.R. Evid. 301(b).
31. For example, in Maine's new child support guidelines statute, there is a "rebuttable presumption that the parental support obligation derived from the support
guidelines is the amount ordered to be paid, unless support is established under (the
section of the statute authorizing deviations from the guidelines]." P.L 1990, ch. 834,
Part A (effective April 17, 1990). Without commenting on the obvious anachronism in
the wording of the statute, let it be said that this is no evidentiary presumption at all.
The guidelines establish the norm; the party who opposes the norm bears the burden
of persuading the trial judge to deviate from it. Id. § 317.
There was a time when there was a second "presumption" hovering around the
MPA. the "presumption" that an equitable division of property was one that split the
property equally between the spouses. See Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356, 1359 n.5
(Me. 1980). Like the MPA's "presumption" and that in the child support statute, this
one had nothing to do with finding a fact upon the proof of another fact. Happily,
before this particular "presumption" could befuddle evidence students, the Law
Court rejected it. See Robinson v. Robinson, 554 A.2d 1173 (Me. 1989). It continues
to thrive elsewhere. See I. ELLhim, P. Kurrz & A. STANToN, FAmmy LAw: CAs. T=r.
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Since the MPA's scheme is not an evidentiary presumption, we
may analyze its operation free from the undesirable effect of the
Rules of Evidence, which do not apply. If a solution to our wedding
gift problem is to be found, we may look elsewhere. However, we
need not search for devices external to the MPA to lever a reasonable solution out of the statute if the statute itself can be interpreted
so as to provide a satisfactory result. In fact, a reconsideration of the
substantive definition of the "presumption" itself, and a close inspection of the statute's definition of "marital property," will do just
that.
V.

RECONSIDERING THE MPA
A.

The "Presumption"

The MPA states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he presumption of
marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was
acquired by a [nonmarital] method . . . .,s2 That phrase is deceptively simple. At first glance, it appears to mean that when a party
proves a nonmarital method of acquisition, the property must be
declared nonmarital. That is certainly how the Law Court has interpreted it to date.' 3
However, the phrase is susceptible of another interpretation: the
phrase could provide that the nonmarital methods identified by the
MPA are the exclusive means of overcoming the "presumption"-and nothing more. An analogy to other phraseology may help
explain the point. The phrase, "The game of baseball is won by scoring runs," means that runs are the only things that count toward
victory; hits do not count, walks do not count, errors and strikeouts
do not count. But scoring runs does not guarantee victory; the
phrase does not say that whoever scores runs wins. The phrase
merely identifies runs as the exclusive means to victory.
PROBLEMS 258-59 (1986).
Presumptions are an evidentiary morass, as anyone knows who has ever studied
them closely. See 1 J. WEmNSTmN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

300[01] at

300-1 ("IT]he subject remains elusive. The difficulty lies not so much in deciding
what a presumption is, but in determining what a presumption does.") It is not at all
apparent why those who write statutes, many of whom have attended law school and
have presumedly studied evidence, keep insisting on employing the evidentiary presumption when all they have to do is write a simple assignment of the burden of
proof. Cf. Uniform Probate Code, supra note 30. For an excellent discussion of why
presumptions are an inappropriate device in criminal statutes, and why affirmative
defenses are preferable, see Jeffries and Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions,and Burden of Proof in the CriminalLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979). The message of that fine
article is broader than the article's focus: statutory presumptions should be avoided
whenever possible; those who write presumptions into statutes should be condemned,
la Sisyphus, to interpreting and applying their work product.
32. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(3) (1981).
33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, the MPA's subject phrase can be interpreted as providing that the nonarital methods of acquiring property listed in the
statute are the only things that a party who opposes the marital presumption4 can rely on to defeat it. Thus, for example, a party may
not expect to prevail against the presumption by proving that he or
she acquired the property during the marriage by winning the Irish
Sweepstakes. Such a fact is not permitted by the statute to overcome the presumption. On the other hand, proof that. property was
obtained during the marriage by gift from a third party is permitted
to overcome the presumption. The emphasis in the foregoing
sentences, of course, is on the word "permitted." The crucial point is
that the MPA's language under scrutiny here does not have to be
interpreted as compelling any particular result, but only as permitting it. The subject phrase can, without strain, be interpreted as
meaning that proof of a nomarital method of acquisition may overcome the presumption.
B.

The Definitions

By excluding the presumption's adverse procedural consequences,
we reduce to one the statutory impediments to a resolution of the
vase problem: we still must contend with the definitions in the
MPA, which also may be interpreted as requiring the exclusion of
the post-marital vase from the newlyweds' marital estate. However,
an inspection of the statute's definitions reveals that they, too, may
be construed to provide trial judges with leeway to avoid the absurd.
Subsection 2 of the MPA, labelled "Definition," states, "'marital
property' means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent
to the marriage except" gifts and inheritances, among other things."
One implication of that language is that gifts, inheritances and the
like, which are not marital, simply have to be "nonmarital." This is
certainly the most obvious interpretation of the phrase.
There is another way to interpret the phrase, however. The statute may also mean that all property acquired after marriage must be
treated as marital unless it falls into one of the statute's exceptions,
in which case the obligation to treat it as marital dissolves. It is
important to note that the MPA does not expressly denominate the
exceptions to marital property as nonmarital, so it does not ex34. Having made the point that the MPA's "presumption" is not a presumption
in the true, evidentiary sense, I will drop the quotation marks for the rest of the

article.
35. ME.REv.STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2) (1981) (emphasis added). For convenience in this article, I frequently refer to the exceptions in the "Definition" section
of the MPA as "nonmarital sources" or property, or as "nonmarital modes of acquisition," or as other "nonmarital" concepts. I do not mean to suggest by such usage that
the exceptions are necessarily nonmarital creatures of statute. I only mean to keep
the phraseology simple.
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pressly obligate a judge to treat them as such. In other words, the
exceptions in the definition need not serve as an absolute exclusion:
property that is initially excepted from the term "marital" is neither
expressly nor necessarily excluded from the marital category for all
time.
This point may be illustrated by the following sentence: "The
term 'night' means the hours of darkness, except in the Arctic Circle." If the exception were exclusive in that sentence, then the term
"night" could never refer to the hours of darkness in the Arctic Circle. Obviously, however, it can and does. What the sentence means
is that, in the Arctic Circle, the term "night" can refer to both the
hours of darkness and hours of light (as at the summer solstice,
when even at midnight the sun does not set). The "except" serves to
qualify the first phrase, but not to segregate it exclusively from the
second one.
Likewise, in the MPA the exception may be read as other than an
absolute exclusion. Simply stated, since the statute does not expressly declare that gifts received after marriage are nonmarital, it
may be read to mean that all property received after marriage is
necessarily marital except gifts (and so forth), which are not necessarily marital. This interpretation dovetails neatly with the preceding interpretation of the MPA's presumption: gifts are not necessarily marital, but may be deemed such if the party opposing their
marital character fails to "overcome" the presumption by persuading the judge to treat them as nonmarital. To put it another way,
the exceptions identify property, or modes of acquisition, to which
resort may be had to escape the marital hotchpot, but those exceptions do not guarantee the escape. The burden of persuasion remains on the person urging the exception. 8
The adoption of this interpretation of the statute immediately
solves the wedding gift problem. Upon one party's proof that the
vase was received during the marriage, it goes into the marital pot
unless the other party satisfies the judge that it should not. Proof
that the thing was a gift is, by statute, relevant to the issue, but not
conclusive of it; the trial judge may permit such proof to overcome
the presumption, but is not required to do so. Since under the circumstances of our example there is no good reason to declare the
vase nonmarital, the party opposing the court's discretionary power
over it would probably lose.
This view of the MPA's language also helps resolve another property problem, heretofore unresolved by an equally divided Law
Court. In Grant v. Grant,1 the court tried to decide how to categorize property that had been devised to a married couple, during
36. See supra text accompanying note 30.
37. 424 A.2d 139 (Me. 1981).
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their marriage, by a third party. Writing for half of the four-justice
court, Justice Wernick preferred to call the devise nonmarital, justifying his position on a literal reading of the MPA. 3 Writing for the
other half of the court, Justice Glassman argued that it is "fruitless"
to attempt a textual analysis of the language of the MPA; he chose
to call the property marital because it seemed consistent with the
purpose of the MPA to do so.39 Employing the interpretation of the
MPA suggested here, one is driven to neither extreme: one need not
employ the literal interpretation that Justice Wernick advocated but
that produces the wedding gift conundrum discussed above, and one
need not reject outright a textual analysis of the statute as Justice
Glassman proposed. Instead, the issue is simply submitted to the
trial judge for a decision that may be influenced, but not controlled,
by the MPA's specified exceptions. As with our well-worn vase, one
would expect the Grant property to be treated as marital, because
there is no persuasive justification for doing otherwise-in other
words, because it simply makes sense.

VL TRYING DIVORCES IN THE DIVORCE COURT
The immediate procedural consequence of this interpretation of
the MPA is that it takes the primary authority for deciding what is
and is not marital property away from the appellate court and gives
it to the trial court. The advantage of this fact to litigants and jurists alike is enormous. Heretofore, the Law Court has viewed the
MPA's exceptions to the marital norm as strict rules of law, and has
reserved to itself the ultimate authority to define marital property.
the vase either is or is not marital, as a matter of law.'0 The problem
with that approach is that the MPA's few formal exceptions to the
marital norm are so imprecise and unsophisticated, in comparison to
the complex property issues that can develop during marriage, that
it is frequently impossible to determine how the law should be applied to the facts on other than a case-by-case basis.' 1 And as is
often true with case-by-case jurisprudence, the results that the individual cases generate may be broadly inconsistent'2 In fact, attempts at establishing consistency in this field may be as fanciful as
alchemy.
The history of the Law Court's attempts to interpret the MPA
demonstrates that this has been precisely the court's experience.
38.
39.
40.
either

Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 144.
"To prevail on appeal... the plaintiff must show that the District Court
erred in deciding what is marital property or abused its discretion in dividing

that property." Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943, 945 (Me. 1984). See supra note 23.
41. See infra text accompanying note 76.
42. This is because the combination of legal and equitable issue3 in individual
property cases are unpredictably variable. See infra text following note 74.
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The court has been struggling for eighteen years 43 to fit a variety of
increasingly exotic property pegs into the few spartan holes that the
MPA provides,4 4 with increasingly inconsistent results. This experience demonstrates that, if the court is still hoping to find a unifying
thread, it is ignoring the fact that property is too complex a subject
to submit to the limited legal criteria that the MPA offers. Inconsistency is going to be the rule in this field; it would be better to surrender to that inevitability by turning over to the trial courts the
primary responsibility for defining what is marital and what is
nonmarital property. The alternative is to make those litigants who
can afford to do so try their divorce cases in the Law Court, and as
the following history demonstrates, that costly approach offers no
advantage to anyone.
VII.

THE LAW

COURT MEETS THE

TAR BABY

It is appropriate to focus the discussion of the court's textual
4
analysis of the MPA on its 1980 decision in Carter v. Carter,'
because it was with that case that the court acknowledged for the first
time that strict loyalty to the MPA's text could produce undesirable
results. Prior to that time, the court had been willing to work within
the text of the statute-to interpret its terms rather than to abandon them. For example, in the 1979 decision of Tibbetts v. Tibbetts,4" the court worried extensively about what it means to "acquire" property, without ever suggesting that the use of that term in
47
the statute is simply ingenuous.
Carter marked a departure from the forced interpretation approach. In Carter, the husband had owned a parcel of real estate
before the marriage, and after he married he deeded the property to
himself and his wife as joint tenants. 8 Under a strict interpretation
of the MPA the wife's interest was nonmarital-she paid no consideration for it, so it was a gift received during the marriage. 4' Like43. Maine adopted the MPA in 1971, effective January 1, 1972. See Stevens v.
Stevens, 390 A.2d 1074, 1075 (Me. 1978).
44. Examples of the increasingly exotic property issues that the court has dealt
with include whether goodwill in a business is marital "property," Lord v. Lord, 454
A.2d 830 (Me. 1983), and whether a professional license is marital "property," Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987).
45. 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980).
46. 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979).
47. Id. at 74-75.
48. Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d at 1019.
49. See Brackett v. Larrivee, 562 A.2d 138 (Me. 1989). The Law Court defined a
gift as requiring three elements: "donative intent, delivery with intent to surrender
all present and future dominion over the property, and acceptance by the donee." Id.
at 139. A fourth element, lack of consideration, is implicit. It is arguable-but only
barely-that transfer of an interest in real estate by a sole owner into joint tenancy
with another is not a complete surrender of "future dominion," since upon the death
of the donee of the interest his or her claim to the property is extinguished, and the
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wise, the husband's interest should have remained nonmarital because the MPA expressly states that the property's marital or
nonmarital character is not affected by the manner in which title is
held.50 Thus it should have made no difference that he now shared
an interest in the property as a joint tenant instead of owning it
outright. Furthermore, he obtained his joint tenancy in direct exchange for his sole, nonmarital interest. This is another plain indication that his new interest ought to be deemed nonmarital. 51
The Law Court, however, declared that the entire parcel was marital. Borrowing a rule from the Missouri Court of Appeals, 2 the
court declared that whenever a spouse deeds nonmarital property to
himself or herself and his or her spouse, during the marriage and as
joint tenants, the title of both parties is "transmuted" into marital
property.5 3 Transmutation, of course, is nowhere to be found in the
MPA.4 Yet the court was willing to forgo adherence to the literal
text of the statute to produce a desirable result.
It must have come as some surprise to observers of the Law
Court's jurisprudence, therefore, when about a year later, half of the
four-justice court advocated strict loyalty to the text of the MPA in
the Grant case, discussed earlier. 5 In that case Justice Wernick,
writing for himself and Chief Justice McKusick, deferred to the precise language of the MPA when he argued that a devise to both
spouses during marriage is like a gift, and must therefore be
nonmarital. This, of course, is precisely the same analysis that the
donor gets his or her sole interest back. See Irvin L. Young Found. v. Damll, 511
A.2d 1069, 1070 (Me. 1986). Against that argument is the rule that the donee can

deed his or her new interest to a third party at any time, thus severing the tenancy in
common and destroying any designs the donor might have on the donee's interest

See Maine Sav. Bank v. Bridges, 431 A.2d 633, 635-36 (Me. 1981).
50. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(3) (1981).
51. Id. § 722-A(2)(B).
52. The Missouri decision that the Law Court relied on was Conrad v. Bowers,
533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
53. Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1022 (Me. 1980) ("[Clommentators have
equated the conveyance of property into joint tenancy and the MiEsouri court's treatment of that action with the community property doctrine of transmutation.").
54. Transmutation is a product of Missouri common law:

Application of the statutory language would result in an immediate presumption that the property was marital because acquired during marriage.
A reclassification as separate would occur when it was shown that the
source of the funds used to buy it was separate property.. . . The dissent
[in Conrad v. Bowers] criticized the holding for modifying the statutory
structure. However, the majority had to deal with the common law presumption, long recognized in Missouri, that when one marital partner titles
property in the names of both, he intends a gift to or settlement upon the

other.
Krauskopf, MaritalProperty at MarriageDissolution, 43 Mssowu IL Rsv. 157, 190

(1978).
55.

See supra text accompanying note 37.
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court had rejected when considering the wife's interest in Carter.
Justice Wernick's opinion in Grant certainly dealt a blow to those
who had viewed Carter as the entire court's acknowledgment that
the language of the MPA is deceivingly simple, and simply unreliable. Furthermore, it must have provoked uncertainty about when,
and under what circumstances, the court would again abandon the
MPA's text in search of a good result.
The court dealt another blow to admirers of Cartertwo years later
when, in Hall v. Hall,58 it limited Carter to "documentary transaction[s]." In Hall, the husband had owned a home before marriage.
After marriage, he and his wife spent some of their marital money
on improvements to the home, which nevertheless remained in his
name only. The wife argued that, irrespective of title, the dedication
of marital funds to the home transmuted it into marital property.
She had the support of Illinois precedent, 57 which had applied this
reasoning to a similar fact situation controlled by a statute nearly
identical to the MPA.
The Law Court, however, spurned Illinois' analysis and rejected
the argument, stating that "[t]o permit nonmarital property to be
'transmuted' into marital property and thus to be subject to equitable distribution deprives a spouse of nonmarital property contrary
to legislative intent."581 One wonders how the husband in Carter
would have felt had he read that, and discovered that the Law
Court made not the slightest attempt to distinguish Carteron other
than the factual basis described above.59 The conclusion in Hall necessitated suspicion of the license that Carter had taken with the
MPA's language; after the double whammy of Grant and Hall one
might have expected that Carter's approach to the MPA's text was
moribund.
But in 1988 Cummings v. Cummings ° proved that Carter's cavalier spirit was alive and well. In Cummings, the court decided that a
lump-sum workers' compensation award received after divorce may
not be marital property even if the injury for which the award is
made occurred during the marriage. In pertinent part the court held
that:
[b]ecause the compensation award is property acquired after the
dissolution of the marriage, the marital presumption does not apply. Consequently, it is burden [sic] of the wife, as the party assert56. 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983).
57. In re Marriage of Smith, 86 M. 2d 518, 56 IlM.Dec. 693, 427 N.E.2d 1239
(1981); In re Marriage of Lee, 87 IlM. 2d 64, 58 IlR. Dec. 779, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981).
58. Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d at 1182.
59. This is the court's entire comment on the subject: "Carter is distinguishable
from the instant case, in which there is no such documentary transaction." Id. at
1181.
60. 540 A.2d 778 (Me. 1988).

1991]

MAINE'S MARITAL PROPERTY ACT

ing that the award is marital, to establish that the lump-sum includes, in part, reimbursement for an expenditure of marital
assets.8 1
In other words, proof by one party that the property is received
outside of the period of the marriage places upon the other party
the burden of persuading the judge that the property is marital.
That decision opens a Pandora's box of uncertainties. Although
the point is not clear in Cummings, the award must be marital (if at
all) because the cause of action arose-was "acquired"-during the
marriage."2 One assumes that this is what the court meant, because
otherwise Cummings must be read to hold that any property acquired after divorce, under any circumstances, is subject to a marital
property claim by a former spouse;6 3 that the court intended that

result is unlikely. However, Cummings departed from precedent
when it inverted the MPA's presumption, placing the ultimate burden of persuasion upon the party who asserts that the property realized after a marriage is marital, rather than upon the party who
opposes that conclusion. If the MPA's presumption were interpreted
as it had been before, all the wife in Cummings had to do was to
show that the cause of action arose during the marriage; such proof
is supposed to label the property marital and place the burden of
persuasion to the contrary on the husband.6 However, Cummings
provides that some property received after marriage is nonmarital
and requires the party who objects to that characterization to prove
otherwise.6 5
61. Id. at 780.
62. The court had previously declared that personal injury causes of action are
"property" subject to the MPA. See Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976 (Me. 1934).
63. The husband in Cummings "acquired" the settlement award after divorce. 540
A.2d at 779. If all property "acquired" after divorce is marital, then the MPA works
an obvious absurdity. Therefore, the Law Court cannot have meant that property
acquired after divorce is marital; it must have meant that elements of property that
were acquired during marriage may be obtained after divorce and still be subject to a
marital property claim.
64. Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d at 978. See Van De Loo v. Van De Loo, 346
N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. App. 1984):
The burden of proving the purpose of part or all of the recovery, however, is on the party seeking a nonmarital classification. That party must
produce demonstrable proof that the amount of the recovery was awarded
for his personal injuries and not for replacement of property marital in nature. Absent such proof, the proceeds recovered for any injury occurring
during the marriage will all be treated as marital property.
65. It may be helpful to work through the argument step by step to see why this is
so. In Cummings the husband's work-related injury occurred during the marriage, so
his right to claim compensation for the injury also arose during the marriage. See Mr
R v. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 51 (1989). However, the court's discussion of this property
issue focused not on the date when the claim arose, but on the date when the claim
would be paid and the money received; in Cummings, that was after the parties' divorce. 540 A.2d at 779. In other words, the property that was acquired for purposes of
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Cummings brought the Law Court back full circle to where it had
MPA analysis was not the cause of action, but the money settlement itself. Thus the
court held that "the compensation award is property acquired after the dissolution of
the marriage." Id. at 780.
The court then declared that, because this "property" would be "acquired" after
the marriage ended, "the marital presumption does not apply." Id. Therefore, the
court concluded, the wife, "as the party asserting that the award is marital," had "to
establish that the lump-sum includes... reimbursement for an expenditure of marital assets." Id. That language is more than the mere assignment of a burden of producing evidence (which is all that the wife would have under a conventional interpretation of the MPA, see note 18 supra). The court required her to establish that some
portion of the settlement had a marital character, and it expressly pulled the marital
presumption out from under her. Thus the wife was now unsupported by any statutory assignment to her husband of the burden of persuading the trial judge that the
property was nonmarital, so she necessarily bore entirely upon herself the burden of
persuasion that it was marital. If one may define "burden of proof" as a combination
of the burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion, see J. WIGMORE, supra note
18, §§ 2485-2488 at 283-300; 1 J. WENSTEIN & M. BERGE, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
300101] at 300-2 (1990), then it must be said that Cummings assigned the entire burden of proof to the wife.
There is reason to doubt the court's logic. First of all, the court never explained
why the "property" was the settlement rather than the cause of action. Previously the
court had expressly held that "[c]hoses in action, rights and other interests, the benefits of which may be receivable now and in the future are classifiable as intangible
personal property." Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d at 978. Without discussing or distinguishing that specific holding, however, the court in Cummings simply concluded
that because workers' compensation lump-sum benefits are compensation for future
earnings, "benefits that accrue and are paid after the termination of the marriage are
no more a part of the marital property than are the worker's future earnings." Cummings v. Cummings, 540 A.2d at 780. That makes sense, of course, but it doesn't
make such lump-sum payments separate "property"; they remain the fruit of the
original cause of action, the work-related injury. See In re Marriage of Dettore, 408
N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ill. App. 1980) ("[iflf the claim for a [workers'] compensation award
accrues during the marriage, the award is marital property regardless of when received"). But the court never paused to analyze that fact (at least in its published
opinion). Instead, the court invented a burden of proof, assigned it ex post facto to
the wife, and ruled that she had not met it.
None of that was necessary. The court could have produced precisely the same
result, with substantially less rearranging of the statutory furniture, had it simply
held that the post-divorce award was given in exchange for post-marital income, and
that the MPA was never intended to apply to such stuff. To be sure, the MPA never
expressly addresses this issue-the statute's perspective on nonmarital property is
almost exclusively premarital, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 19, § 722-A(2), another of
the drafters' many oversights-but there is plenty of authority for it, not the least of
which is common sense. See also In re Marriage of Johnson, 40 Colo. App. 250, 576
P.2d 188 (Colo. App. 1978) (property acquired after a divorce decree is not divisible
by the divorce court). Had the court ruled this way, it could merely have stated that
the wife properly generated the issue of the marital nature of the award by demonstrating that the cause of action arose during the marriage, and that the husband
successfully overcame the presumption by showing the nature of the award itself.
Viewed this way, the wife's failure to demonstrate the marital nature of the award
is merely a failure to respond with evidence to a convincing evidentiary presentation
put on by her husband-in other words, she lost because her husband's evidence was
better. This result would have been consistent with all of the court's previous case

1991]

MAINE'S MARITAL PROPERTY ACT

left off with Carter eight years earlier: abandonment of the specific
statutory language in pursuit of a desirable result. Having zigged
back toward Carterin 1988, however, the court zagged away again in
1990. In Dubord v. Dubord66 the court decided to limit Carter
"'only to an interspousal transfer creating a joint tenancy' in real
estate. 61 7 Mrs. Dubord had used some $20,000 from her nonmarital

funds to contribute to the down payment for a home that the parties
purchased in joint tenancy during their marriage. The trial court declared that those funds had been contributed to the marital estate,
and declared the residence fully marital. But the Law Court reversed because, "[h]aving found that these funds were non-marital
property, the Superior Court could not properly avoid setting aside
a portion of the equity in the home as non-marital property merely
by labeling these funds 'contributions.' ,,s In other words, the wife's
use of funds from a nonmarital source to purchase a jointly titled
asset, during the marriage, did not transmute those funds into marital property. The funds, and the growth they naturally enjoyed as
an investment in an appreciating asset, remained hers.
Dubord appears to limit Carter to its facts: transmutation only
applies to the postmarital transfer, without consideration, of
nonmarital real estate into joint tenancy. But close analysis suggests
that the attempted limitation fails, because Dubord was incomplete:
the court did not explain why the wife's contribution to the down
payment of a jointly titled asset should not be considered a gift of
half of the down payment to the husband, and therefore at least
partly his nonmarital property. This was the argument that the wife
had made in Carter- when the husband's nonmarital asset became
jointly owned by the spouses, without the exchange of consideration,
she had received a gift of half of that asset, and such a gift must be
deemed nonmarital under the MPA. Carter rejected that argumentthe wife's resulting interest was not a gift to her; rather it and the
husband's remaining interest were transmuted into a marital asset,
the property of the marital enterprise."' In other words, transmutation superseded the MPA's gift exception to the marital property
law on the presumption (except Carter), as well as with Moulton, the sole concession

being that the statute's drafters overlooked the possibility that someone might try to
make a claim against property realized after divorce. One must wonder why the court
felt compelled to engage in such massive and unnecessary statutory reconstruction.
66. 576 A.2d 257 (Me. 1990).
67. Id. at 260 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943, 947 n.5 (hie. 1934)).
68. Id. at 259.
69. See Oldtam, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAL LQ. 219,
239 (1989) ("If a court determines that a gift occurred [by one spouse's titling
nonmarital property in both spouses' names], it normally is considered a gift to the
marital estate, so the property is marital property, not 50 percent the separate property of each spouse.") (citing Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980)).
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presumption. When transmutation applies, the gift exception7 0 does
not.
Dubord rejected transmutation but it did not reinstate the MPA's
gift exception. Instead, by implication Dubord followed Carter's
lead: it apparently rejected the argument that Mrs. Dubord's
$20,000 contribution was a partial gift to her husband. Thus to a

certain degree Dubord is consistent with Carter, because both of
those decisions disembowel the MPA's treatment of gifts received
during marriage. Thus, and to that same degree, Carter continues to
have an influence that is broader than its facts. For whatever reason,
one spouse's transfer of a nomnarital asset into joint tenancy during
marriage and without consideration either is not a gift to the other
spouse of the latter's resulting interest, contrary to the apparent
purpose of the MPA (Dubord),71 or it is a gift that,7 2contrary to the
MPA's express language, becomes marital (Carter).
If that is so, then Dubord has one of two divergent consequences.
On the one hand, it seems intended to limit Carter's influence by
expressly limiting the applicability of transmutation, but on the
other hand it actually invigorates Carter by impliedly preserving
Carter's dilapidation of the MPA's gift exception to the marital
property presumption. Applying this conclusion to the theme of this
article, Dubord tells us at once either that Carter's high-handed
method of interpreting the MPA is discarded, or that it is affirmed.
If all of this seems complicated, it is. In fact, it is too complicated,
and that is precisely my quarrel with the MPA: the MPA's simple
rules produce hopelessly arcane problems. Unfortunately, however,
it gets worse, because Dubord leaves us with a grim dilemma. The
lawyers and judges who deal with divorce daily, and who have a recurring need to understand the law and to predict its application,
must now decide how to interpret this latest jog in the MPA's tortuous history. Was Dubord's omission about the possible gift to the
husband an oversight, or was it intended?
The former alternative is the less attractive, because it suggests
that the court was not thorough.7 1 Unfortunately, that same conclu70. And, from Carter's husband's point of view, the exchange-for-nonmarital.
property exception.
71. There is nothing in the official Comment to the original version of § 307 of the
UMDA that suggests that the drafters intended other than the ordinary law of gifts
to apply to the "gift" exception to the presumption. See HANDBOOK, supra note 15 at
204. That being so, Mrs. Dubord's use of $20,000 toward the purchase of an asset
titled in her and her husband's name should have been a gift of $10,000 to him. See
supra text accompanying note 49.
72. See supra text following note 46.
73. Oddly, in Dubord the court repeatedly discussed the concept of "donative in.
tent" without ever discussing whether the wife made a gift to the husband. The court
held thatThe Carter presumption of donative intent, which may be overridden
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sion is available about another of the court's recent decisions, Cummings. A persuasive argument can be made that the court did not
need to shift the burden of proof to the wife in that case, but that it
did so simply because it misunderstood how the MPA's presumption
should operate.7 4 If this is true of both of those decisions, then one
must wonder whether the MPA is simply too arcane for the Law
Court itself, and anyone who longs for reliable rules and predictable
results in this field must rue the possibility that future Law Court
decisions will vary-unpredictably, of course-with the court's ability to untangle the Act and the Act's case law progeny. Naturally,
the court must take the heat if this is so, but ultimately the problem
lies not with the court but with the MPA itself. And it should go
without saying that if the MPA bamboozles the Law Court, then it
is certainly inappropriate for everyday use by parties, trial lawyers
and trial judges.
An alternative interpretation of Dubord and Cummings is that the
court fully intended every facet of its decisions in those cases. If this
is so, then those wishful loyalists who pursue reliability, predictability and dependability in divorce property law must accept this indelible lesson of the past decade: the Law Court's jurisprudence
under the MPA is frequently but unpredictably result-oriented.
Cartermade no bones about it: the court readily acknowledged that
its decision was intended to "avoid... illogical and inequitable results ... ."75 Cummings, too, has the ring of equity to it. One
senses that the court wanted to entitle a wife, who had been living
with her husband's work-related injury since two months after their
marriage, to pursue at least a portion of her husband's award, but
feared allowing marital property claims to linger after divorce;,7 thus
only by clear and convincing evidence, must be strictly limited to situations
where the presumed gift to the marital property is to be necessarily inferred
from the factual predicate, as it was in the circumstances of the Carter
case. Were we to apply the Carter presumption to the present facts, we
would effectively abandon the source of funds rule and hold that the mere
act of taking property in joint names results in a gift to the marital estate
of any separate property used as part of the purchase price.
Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d at 260. The court was prepared to talk about gifts to the
marital estate, but not about gifts to the person. A review of the Law Court briefs
shows that the parties did not argue that the wife had made a gift to the husband,
but only that she had "manifested a clear intention to contribute to the (marital]
partnership." Brief for Appellee at 13, Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d 257 (hie. 1990)
(No. KEN-90-22). That means that, for appellate purposes, they waived the isue of a
gift to him. However, the Law Court's failure even to acknowledge that omipsion, and
to warn itsreadership that the incomplete posture of the issues necessitated an incomplete decision, means that the court was most likely unaware that an important
issue had been overlooked by counseL
74. See supra text accompanying note 68.
75. 419 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Me. 1980).
76. Consider the problem of the personal injury cause of action that accrues to
one party during the marriage, but for which the settlement award is not paid until
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the court may have balanced the equities by making the wife do the
proving.
The problem with this kind of approach to the MPA, obviously, is
that it establishes no broadly reliable body of law. All that it does,
rather, is to suggest that whenever the MPA fails to dictate a clear
and reasonable result, the ultimate rule will be wholly unpredictable. Over the past decade the court has demonstrated that different
cases, involving not only different legal issues but also different equities, may generate rules of law that are at least inconsistent, and
perhaps unique. In other words, in that decade the court failed to
find any golden, unifying thread in the MPA, and gave rise to dismal doubt that such a thing is even worth pursuing.
It takes little imagination to drive this point home; the problem
may be illustrated by the following fictional fact pattern. A husband
owned a parcel of land before he got married. During the marriage
he leased the property to a lessee for twenty years, and during the
term of the lease the lessee built a fine log cabin on the property-a
permanent improvement that will undoubtedly remain there after
the expiration of the lease. The lease will expire three years after the
parties' divorce, which is now being litigated. Neither the husband
nor the wife had any knowledge that this improvement had been
made to the property until the wife inspected the lot in preparation
for the divorce.
Will the Law Court declare the increased value of the property
marital or not? The arguments based on the text of the MPA go
either way: the increased value is marital because it is the product of
the lease, which was the product of marital effort and is therefore
marital property;7 the increased value is nonmarital because the
husband gave no consideration for it so it was a gift.75 To what extent will equitable issues play a role in the court's decision: does it
make any difference whether it is fair to let the husband lay sole
claim to a substantially enhanced piece of property? How will the
presumption operate? Is it the husband's obligation to prove that
the enhanced value is nonmarital, or (in view of the fact that the
husband will "acquire" the cabin from the lessee after the marriage
is over) is it up to the wife to prove that that value is marital?
The ultimate answer to these questions is beyond this author's
ability to provide, because I have no crystal ball-and that is the
after the divorce. If, for example, the divorce court assigns the husband 10% of any
award the wife ever receives for her personal injury, as his share of the intangible
marital asset that is the wife's cause of action, does he have the right to argue after
divorce that his 10% interest entitles him to the power to approve or veto any pro.
posed settlement offered to the wife? Conversely, if his wife refuses to settle out of
continued bitterness toward him, can he force a settlement? I have found no case law

on this issue (and, of course, the MPA offers no guidance).
77. See Macdonald v. Macdonald, 532 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Me. 1987).
78. Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139, 143 (Me. 1981).
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point. The MPA tells us nothing about how to decide this issue, and
case law is hardly more helpful. The only way to be sure is to appeal
the trial court's decision to the Law Court, and have the justices tell
us what the MPA means in this particular circumstance. In any
event, no matter how the court decides the question, it will lay to
rest none of the uncertainties discussed above. In fact, if the history
of the MPA over the past decade is any indication, such a decision
will probably generate even greater confusion.
VIII

DELAWARE OFFERS A SOLUTION

As suggested above, it is not difficult to postulate a property problem for which there is no apparent solution either in the MPA or in
case law. Property is a broad and complex subject, far too complicated and subtle for the few simple tools the MPA gives us to deal
with it. Practically all lawyers can draw from their own daily experiences to develop a fact pattern for which neither the MPA nor local
judicial precedent offers a rule.79 Delaware has taken a different approach from the Law Court to the problem of developing such rules
under its version of the same Uniform Act upon which the MPA is
based. That approach is worth some attention because it offers a
solution to this problem.
The facts that inspired the Delaware Supreme Court to handle its
own marital property act differently involved shares of stock in a
79. Here are three quick examples:
1. The husband is the beneficiary under his mother's testamentary trust, and is also
one of two trustees. He and the other trustee (his brother) manage the assets of the
trust and each may (but is not required to) receive up to $10,000 annually from trust
income. Is the $10,000 marital property? (Note that the official Comment to § 307 of
the UMDA states that "income from... non-marital property acquired after the
marrie is marital property." See HANDBOOK, supra note 15 at 204). Does the husband have to exercise his power of appointment and "acquire" the money from the
trust before it becomes marital, or is it marital as it accrues? Can the husband be
compelled to exercise his power of appointment to produce marital property?
2. If a nonmarital asset increases in value as the result of "marital effort," the increase in value is marital property. Macdonald v. Macdonald, 532 A.2d 1046, 1050
(Me. 1987). Is the converse true? If, as a result of marital effort, the value of a
nonmarital asset declines, is that loss in value chargeable against the marital estate?
3. Is a monetary award for a personal injury that occurred during marriage marital
property? Compare Gan v. Gan, 83 M11.
App.3d 265, 269, 404 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1980)
('The husband's personal injury settlement does not fit within any of the exceptions
to marital property enumerated in the Act. ...
In accordance with the statutory
presumption [identical to Maine's] the personal injury settlement proceeds must be
deemed marital property.") with Weakley v. Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Ky. 1937)
("[W]hen the injury occurs during the marriage, the injured party, prior to marriage,
was free of the pain for which damages are awarded... [A]s to pain and suffering
resulting from an injury sustained during the marriage, the injured party has simply
exchanged property acquired before the marriage, Le., good health, ...
for the
money received as compensation for the loss.").
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closely held corporation. In J.D.P. v. F.J.H.,s0 the husband owned
more than half of the outstanding common stock in each of two Delaware corporations at the time of marriage. During the marriage the
retained earnings of the corporation increased substantially, and the
parties could not agree whether those earnings were marital or not.
The husband argued that the retained earnings were not marital
property as a matter of law and relied on a Missouri decision for
authority."' (Missouri has a statute nearly identical to those of Delaware and Maine. 2) The Missouri court approached its statute just
as the Law Court has approached Maine's: the statutory exceptions
are strictly applied to each and every item of property presented,
and each item is deemed marital or nonmarital as a matter of law. 8
But Delaware rejected this approach, which it called "rigid" and
"dogmatic," preferring to allow the trial judge to consider evidence
about how the property should be categorized, and then to rule as
he or she is persuaded by the evidence.8 ' Thus on the subject of
80. 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979).
81. Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App. 1976).
82. According to the Delaware court in J.D.P., Davis
applied the literal language of a statute comparable to § 1513(b)(3) [Delaware's version of the Uniform Act's § 307] and refused to declare that corporate assets acquired prior to the marriage were community property. To
the extent that our statute is regarded as comparable to Missouri's, we can
only say that, in our opinion, our General Assembly intended that cases
under our statute should be governed by equitable principles in accordance
with the tradition of domestic litigation and the remedial purpose of the
whole Act.
Id. at 211 n.2. Missouri's, Delaware's, and Maine's marital property acts are, for purposes pertinent to this discussion, identical. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b) (Supp.
1988); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2) (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1990).
83. In Davis the husband owned three-fourths of the outstanding stock of a small
corporation that operated a retail gasoline station and sold and delivered gasoline,
fuel oil and propane to area residents. The wife was a vice president of the corporation and on the board of directors. The husband had owned all his stock before the
marriage.
The Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that the husband's stock ownership was
nonmarital:
The evidence showed that the appellant's interest in the Knob Noster Oil
Company, Incorporated, was acquired before his marriage to respondent.
There was no evidence to show that the status of that property changed
during the marriage and the trial court should not have considered it marital property and should not have allotted respondent an interest in the corporate assets.
Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d at 264.
84. In pertinent part, the court provided this explanation for its decision:
[T]he current law is substantially different from the predecessor statute.
... Unlike the prior law, § 1513, on its face, does not favor the wife over
the husband. Rather, there is a broad definition of marital property and a
wide discretion vested in the Family Court to assign any of that property to
either or both of the spouses.
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retained earnings the Delaware Supreme Court declared that a
judge might consider (among other things) whether the shareholderspouse had managed the corporation during the marriage, thereby
being in large part responsible for producing the earnings himself or
herself; whethier the spouse had directed them to be retained and, if
so, whether this was done to prevent his or her spouse's access to
them through the divorce; and what the tax consequences might be
to the spouses and to the corporation of any order the court might
issue.85 In other words, the court gave the trial judge the authority
to decide whether the retained earnings of a close corporation
should be deemed marital or nonmarital property based on considerations of evidence and (ultimately) common sense rather than on
a strict reading of the MPA.
The Delaware court was not completely comfortable with this new
rule, acknowledging that "it is far easier to announce this construction of [Delaware's statute] than it is to apply it."' Obviously, the
court was concerned about the possibility that this new approach
might open jurisprudential floodgates. To date, the Delaware court
has not allowed that to happen. Relevant subsequent Delaware case
law indicates that the discretionary authority conferred in J.D.P.
has not been extended to other issues; under Delaware's version of
the MPA, the J.D.P. rule applies only to retained earnings of close
corporations. Thus, in one respect, the J.D.P. rule is scarcely differAgainst that background, we consider the contention of the husband that
the Court should rule, in effect, that retained earnings of a corporation controlled by one of the spouses cannot be, that is, can neuer be, marital property, as a matter of law.
Given the broad, remedial purpose of the Act, with its mandate to the
Court to equitably divide all property which spouses acquired after mar-

riage (with few exceptions), and to do that in a way which will mitigate
potential harm to the spouses (caused by the divorce), we must reject the

rigid and dogmatic construction of the statute for which the husband argues. To hold otherwise would seriously limit the Court in the exercise of
its equitable powers and invite evasion of the property division law and
consequent injury to a spouse and, at the same time, deny a remedy to that

spouse.
This is to say that if retained corporate earnings were regarded in every
instance as a [statutory] exemption from "marital property," then the
spouse who controls the corporation (including, for example, its salary and
dividend practices) would have the power to determine whether earnings

are to be retained and thus insulated from all legal and equitable claim of
the other spouse. Certainly a statute which commands a Court to "equita-

bly divide".., property between spouses is not intended to give that sort
of unilateral control to one of them....
We hold that an increase, during the marriage, in retained earnings of a
corporation controlled by a spouse may be included in the calculation of
the couple's marital property.
J.D.P. v. F.J.H., 399 A.2d at 210-11 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 211.
86. Id.
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ent from the "rigid and dogmatic" rule that the Delaware court rejected, because, once again, a court developed a specific rule to cover
specific property; such a rule has no broad precedential value until
and unless the court that developed it allows its application to other
issues.
Yet, in another respect, J.D.P. is a significant precedent, because
it represents an important court's repudiation of the case-by-case,
item-by-item approach that our Law Court has employed. In J.D.P.,
Delaware recognized that the authority to categorize a complicated
property issue as marital or nonmarital must be delegated to the
trial court. Delaware, of course, did not adopt or even suggest the
interpretation of the statutory language that this article proposes;
the court there relied on broad, prefatory
language apparently
87
unique to their version of the Uniform Act.
Nevertheless, the Delaware court made it clear that the MPA as it
is currently applied in Maine is inadequate for the purpose.
IX.

ENTRUSTING TRIAL JUDGES WITH THE FLEXIBILITY OF COMMON
SENSE

It is the thesis of this article that Maine should adopt the J.D.P.
approach for all property acquired after marriage. But having suggested that the Law Court's case-by-case, item-by-item approach to
the MPA is frustrating at best, and self-destructive at worst, it remains to be asked whether the alternative would really be better. Is
it a good idea to endow trial courts with broad authority to decide
what is marital property and what is not? Can we trust our trial
courts to do it "right"?
One answer is that in all other facets of domestic relations law
Maine trial courts exercise virtually the same authority urged for
them here. In determining issues of custody, child support, alimony,
and (of course) the distribution of marital property, the trial courts
utilize broad powers of equity that are reviewable only for abuse of
discretion.88 To allow trial courts to define which property acquired
after marriage is marital and which is not would be to give them
powers consistent (although not precisely equivalent) with those
that they otherwise exercise in family law cases.8 9
87. The Delaware act provides that it is to be "liberally construed" to promote its
purposes, including the mitigation of "potential harm to spouses... caused by the
process of legal dissolution of marriage." DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, § 1502 (1981).
88. Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d 845, 847 (Me. 1984) (citing Gardner v. Perry, 405
A.2d 721, 725 (Me. 1979)).

89. Trial judges exercise their powers to award alimony, assign child support, determine custody of children, and the like, as an exercise of discretion. See Gardner v.
Perry, 405 A.2d 721 (Me. 1979). Under my interpretation of the MPA, a judge would
determine whether to declare property marital or nonmarital as a function of his or
her determination of the evidence-i.e., as a finding of fact. The appellate standard
for review of such a finding is clear error. See M.R. Civ. P. 52. I do not maintain that
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A second answer deals more specifically with the relationship between alimony and the distribution of marital property. Given the
recent change in Maine's alimony statute, it may now make far less
sense- to worry about the fine distinctions between marital and
nonmarital property. For an understanding of this conclusion, it is
necessary to review the common history of Maine's alimony statute
and the MPA.
When what became the MPA first appeared in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (as § 307), it was closely associated with the
following section (§ 308), which dealt with alimony." The two statutes combined to express a clear preference for addressing post-divorce financial need with disproportionate awards of marital property rather than with awards of alimony."' The theory for this
the appellate standards for the exercise of discretion and for the finding of fact are
the same; there is certainly a difference of definition between abuse of discretion and
clear error. However, there is no quantitative difference between the two; it is no
more difficult for an appellant to establish an abuse of discretion than it is to establish clear error, and vice versa. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct 2447,
2458 (1990).
The doctrine of "clear error" applies only to a trial court's factual findings; it does
not apply to the trial court's application of the facts to the law, or to mixed questions
of fact and law, when there is an error of law. In such cases, the trial court's decision
is reviewable de novo on the issue of the legal impropriety of the decision. 5A J.
MooRs, MooRe's FEDRA L PAcrrcE 52.03[2] (2d ed. 1990). In other words, while
the appellate court must hesitate to overrule particular findings of fact, it need not do
so for the legal conclusions the trial court draws from its factual findings. Thus, in
Dubord v. Dubord the Law Court could not change the trial court's factual determinations, but could and did reverse because it disagreed about the legal conclusion the
trial court drew in calling the disputed property marital. To put it another way, the
Law Court's majority deferred to the trial court's determination that the disputed
property was derived from one of the nonmarital methods listed in the definition
section of § 722-A (over the objection of the two dissenting justices). However, the
majority of the Law Court disagreed with, and overruled, the trial court's decision to
declare the property marital, because that was an issue of pure law.
In my view, that issue is not one of pure law. The trial court in Dubord had the
authority to call the property marital as an issue of fact, because it had the right to
conclude that the wife's money ought to be deemed marital That decision should be
reviewable only for clear error.
90. See HABooK,supra note 15, § 308 comment at 205:
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 is to encourage the
court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the available property
is insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who seeks maintenance is
unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills and interests or is
occupied with child care may an award of maintenance be ordered.
...Here, as in Section 307, the court is expressly admonished not to
consider the misconduct of a spouse during the marriage. Instead, the court
should consider the factors relevant to the issue of maintenance, including
those listed in [the statute].
91. See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinsli, 71 IlI. 2d 563, 576, 376 N.E2d 1382, 1388
(1978) ("the legislature... sought to replace the concept of po3t-marital support
through alimony with one of post-marital stability through a just distribution of mar-
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preference was that if divorce was to be a final severing of ties, that
object was better achieved by a means that terminated the spouses'
financial dependence on each other.9 2 Although Maine never
adopted Section 308, by adopting Section 307 Maine necessarily incorporated the objectives of that statute's drafters, including their
goals for the use of marital property instead of alimony.93
For years after the UMDA was drafted, alimony was a disfavored
concept,94 due in significant part to the theory that spousal needs
after divorce should be dealt with primarily by awards of marital
property. 5 In the late 1970's and early 1980's, however, studies were
conducted and published that indicated that many women were suffering financially after divorce precisely because they had not been
ital property and assets"). Illinois had adopted a version of the UMDA nearly identical to the MPA. Id. at 571-72, 376 N.E. 2d at 1386.
92. See, e.g., Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
93. "[T]he intention of the drafters [the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws] becomes legislative intention upon enactment." 2A N.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52.05 (Sands 4th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1990) (citing Mobs v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 349 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984)). See HANDBOOK, supra note 15, § 308 comment at 205. See also Comment, The Maine MaritalProperty Act: The Duties of Divorce Courts and the Right
to an Equitable Share of Marital Assets, 31 MAINE L. REv. 333, 350-51 [hereinafter
Equitable Share of Marital Assets] (1980) (footnotes omitted):
This discretion in the division of marital property must be limited by
acknowledgment of the underlying policies and goals of the Uniform Act.
Thus a division must fairly recognize the economic and non-economic contributions of each spouse.. . A division of property which avoids the necessity of decreeing alimony is most desirable.
But see LEvY, supra note 9, at 8-7: "section 722-A does not incorporate the Uniform
Act's directive that the division of marital property was to be the primary tool for
providing for the parties' respective financial needs, and that alimony was only to be
employed if the marital property proved insufficient for this purpose."
94. See Reynolds, The Relationship of PropertyDivision and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAm L. REV. 827, 844 n.79 (citing L.
WEITzMAN,

DIVORCE REvOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSE-

QUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA

(1985) (citations omitted):

[S]tudies of alimony reveal declining awards. For example, Professor Weitzman's study of divorce in California revealed a decline in alimony from
20% to 15% in the short period from 1968 to 1972. No-fault divorce went
into effect in California in 1970. These numbers assume even more significance when one realizes that there has also been a shift from permanent
awards to transitional awards. By 1977, two-thirds of the alimony awards in
the study were transitional, limited awards. The average duration of these
awards was only two years.
95. See Reynolds, supra note 94, at 834 (footnotes omitted): "[C]ommentators involved in the reform movement apparently assumed that property awards would remain nonmodifiable and extolled the virtues of property division as the superior
means of making economic adjustments at divorce largely on the basis of its
nonmodifiability." Nonmodifiability was said to end controversy between the spouses
by forcing each spouse to make financial plans independent of the other, and to improve judicial economy. Id. at 837.
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awarded any alimony.90 It was shown that the divorce reforms of the
previous decade (like the UMDA) which relied on the scheme of
marital property plus child support, instead of alimony, were severely disadvantaging divorced women with children; thus arose the
term "the feminization of poverty."9 " As a result, calls for reform of
the 1970's divorce reforms have become increasingly insistent, and
have drawn increasing attention."
Maine may have joined the trend: in 1989 the Maine Legislature
amended Maine's alimony statute, and appears significantly to have
broadened the authority of judges to award alimony0 Previous limitations on the availability of alimony appear to have been dramatically reduced; no longer, for example, is alimony limited to a "prospective" purpose (post-divorce financial support);100 now, alimony
may apparently be awarded to compensate a spouse for contributions made during the marriage, to overcome expected financial difficulty after divorce, and for virtually any other reason the trial
court "considers appropriate." 10 1 In other words, alimony may now
be awarded for any reason or purpose heretofore reserved to the
96.
A major University of Michigan study found that seven years after divorce, the real purchasing power of men's income in relation to a standardized index of family need improved by 17%, while the real purchasing
power of women's income in relation to need declined by 7%.. . . Lenore
Weitzman's more recent California study found that a year after divorce,
men's standard of living rose by 42%, while women's standard of living
dropped by 73%.
Goldfarb, Marital Partnershipand the Case for PermanentAlimony, 27 J. Fain. L.
351, 361 (1988-89) (citing Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives and Divorce in 4
FW THousAND AlamcAN FALmm-s-PATrrwS OF ECONOMC PN0Oss 27-31 (G.
Duncan & J. Morgan eds. 1976); L. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce. Social and
Economic Consequences of Property,Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA
L. Rav. 1181, 1210-11 (1981)).
97. See Reynolds, supra note 94, at 829.
98. See generally Reynolds, supra note 94; Goldfarb, supra note 96.
99. Ma Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (Supp. 1990-91). I say that Maine has "apparently" joined the trend toward alimony reform because, while the amendment to
the statute does amount to reform, it cannot be said that the amendment was nece3sarily produced by the same broad policy concerns that are discussed in the text.
According to attorney Judith Andrucki, one of the drafters of the legislation, the
same policy concerns did inspire the drafters. However, whether the Legislatureintended to propel Maine to the cutting edge of divorce reform by adopting the proposed amendment probably cannot be determined. The following is the entire "Statement of Fact" accompanying the bill when it was introduced in committee: "This bill
enumerates the factors a court must consider when determining an alimony award."
LiD. 656, Statement of Fact, (114th Legis. 1989).
100. For an application of the former rule, see, e.g., Skelton v. Skelten, 490 A.2d
1204, 1209 (Me. 1985) ("[A]limony is a substitute for future support, not compensation for past contributions.... ."). For the traditional view of the purpose of alimony
in Maine, see Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 196 A.2d 94 (1963).
101. Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(1)(0) (1989).
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award of marital property. 10 2 And since marital property may be
awarded to either party for virtually any reason that a judge
102. In contrast, one could argue that by requiring the trial court to consider"the
contributions of either party as homemaker" in the new alimony statute ME.Rav.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(1)(K) (1989), the legislature did not intend to allow alimony
to be used to compensate for such contributions, but only to remind trial judges to
think about them when deciding whether or not to award alimony. This interpretation would be consistent with Skelton: "though the District Court may not use 19
M.R.S.A. § 721 to 'compensate' Dorothy Skelton for eighteen years of marriage, it
may consider the ramifications of her occupation during those years, just as it may
consider the more traditional factors in making its award." Skelton v. Skelton, 490
A.2d at 1208. In other words, if Mrs. Skelton's current earning power was diminished
by the number of years she spent raising children at the expense of developing professional skills and experience, alimony may be used to lessen the present economic
disadvantage, but not to compensate for those years of familial service. K. Ainsworth,
Esq., Maine State Bar Association seminar on the Economic Issues in Divorce (March
30, 1990).
That argument seems to unreasonably restrict the new alimony provisions. The
statute instructs the trial judge to "consider" any "factors" that the judge "considers
appropriate." M&. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 19, § 721(1) (1989). This directive is undoubtediy limited by the court's reasonable exercise of discretion (the standard boundary
beyond which no judge should go). However, it is not limited by case law precedent.
Thus one of the factors a judge may now consider is precisely the one prohibited by
Skelton: whether the spouse needs or deserves compensation in the form of alimony
for contributions made to the marital enterprise as a homemaker, or in any other
nonmarketable fashion. If the answer to the question is yes, then it follows that the
judge must be empowered to make the award; to hold otherwise is to disembowel this
broad statutory mandate, which would thereby require the judge to consider and approve of the remedy without authorizing the judge to act on it.
It should be added that the theory of alimony is not settled. In a recent persuasive
article Professor Ira Ellman argues that alimony should be awarded only to compensate for what he calls "marital investment" (which includes such things as a homemaker's contributions to the marital enterprise), irrespective of the spouse's postdivorce need. Defining "marital investment" as "claimworthy conduct giving rise to a
compensable loss in earning capacity," I., Ellman The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 1 (1989), he argues that alimony should "reallocate the postdivorce financial
consequences of marriage in order to prevent distorting incentives." Id. at 50. The
idea is to "compensate[] the wife who has disproportionate postmarriage losses arising from her marital investment... "Id. at 51. The theory does not compensate for
mere financial need:
An alimony law based upon this conception would therefore ask whether
the wife invested in her marriage and is thereby economically disadvantaged upon divorce; it would not inquire into need per se. The wife who
invested little or whose need arose from events unrelated to her marriage
would have no claim against her former husband. Her relief, if she was in
need, would be a societal obligation. By the same token, the wife who suffers economically from the divorce as a result of her marital investment
would have a claim even if her financial situation did not place her "in
need."
Id. at 52. It would appear that the recent, all-inclusive amendment to the alimony
statute would authorize a judge to do just as Professor Ellman suggests. It is doubtful
that a carefully considered alimony award based both on the broad license of Maine's
new alimony statute and on Professor Ellman's studied formula could be deemed an
abuse of discretion.
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chooses, 03 it may be said that, except for the potential longevity
and amendability of alimony, alimony and marital property are now
virtually indistinguishable: a divorce court may award alimony to
accomplish any purpose that an award of marital property might
serve, and vice versa. 0 '
This fact has an important consequence for the fine legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital property: since all marital
property is available for post-divorce support, and since all property
declared nonmarital may be recaptured for the poorer spouse in the
form of alimony,105 the distinction in cases involving alimony between what is marital and what is nonmarital becomes insignificant.
In such cases, all the property of both spouses is available for the
benefit of either for practically any purpose that the divorce court
sees fit (in its reasonable exercise of discretion, of course). Thus in
cases in which a trial court might award alimony, there is no reason
to reject the interpretation of the MPA offered here: the indistinguishable nature of awards of property and alimony endow divorce
courts with precisely the same discretion that this article advocates
for them under the MPA. The differentiation of marital and
nonmarital property in such cases is an inconsequential distinction.
Although that argument does not directly apply to cases that do
not involve alimony issues (for example, where the spouses have
been married only a short time, are both financially independent
and have no children), the reasoning overlaps. Now that alimony is
becoming a more popular remedy, the frequency of cases in which
marital and nonmarital property are functionally distinguishable is
decreasing. Given the blurring of the lines of distinction between the
two, it makes little sense to devote litigants' money and judicial energy to the continued refinement of rigid legal rules of dubious viability and decreasing applicability.
There is, finally, a fundamental reason to alter our approach to
the MPA, one that returns to the theme that has been stated again
and again in this article: the Law Court's approach to the MPA isn't
working. To be sure, the search for a consistent, reliable body of
case law governing the MPA may eventually succeed. But, as recent
103. "[Tihe court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the
marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all
relevant factors. . . ." M. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(I) (1981).
104. In many respects, alimony and marital property are distinguishable. The tax

consequences of the two are different (see Lm, supra note 9, at 7-52 to 53, 8-15 to
20); a marital property obligation may be dischargeable in bankruptcy, whereas an
alimony obligation is not (see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865
F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1989)); alimony is modifiable whereas an award of property is
not (Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035 (Me. 1980) (alimony modifiable); Cyr v. Cyr, 469
A.2d 836 (Me. 1983) (awards of marital property not modifiable)). The point is that
the power of the trial court to award either is equally unlirited.
105. Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d at 1039-40.
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history proves, it is unlikely to succeed in the near future. It will
take years-perhaps decades-for our Law Court to develop a comprehensive, consistent, and reliable approach to the MPA. In the
meantime, divorce lawyers and judges must grapple on a daily basis
with inconsistent, barely-understood, and often nonexistent precedent in a virtually blind effort to advise clients and decide cases. All
of this groping suggests to me an infantry company in combat that
cannot predict where its general staff is aiming the artillery; the
company's officers may have a fair idea of their objective, but getting there can be hazardous. One never knows when the Law Court
will lob a round right into territory that the troops thought was safe.
Maine needs a better approach now. One alternative, the amendment of the MPA, does not appear to be imminent.100 In the
meantime, the only other choice is to make the price of uncertainty
less costly. Instead of making litigants take their chances in the Law
Court, let them take their chances in the trial court. By giving the
divorce courts the authority to decide, as a function of evidence
rather than of strict rules of law, whether spouses' property ought to
be deemed marital or nonmarital, the Law Court would essentially
be limiting the field of battle to the trial level. The advantage to the
litigants is that it would cost them a lot less to find out what the
MPA means in their cases. 10 7 And the concession that the Law
Court would have to make to do this is small: given the dearth of
Maine precedent on the MPA,105 the court would merely be legiti106. This is based on a discussion with Attorney Michael Asen, chair of the Maine
State Bar Family Law Section, in the spring of 1990. Mr. Asen expressed to me a
dissatisfaction with the present statute based on what I interpreted to be grounds
similar to the concerns I have expressed in this article. He indicated that the Family
Law Section would be discussing statutory alternatives, but that there was no consensus on an alternative, and no replacement statutes under consideration at that time.
107. The importance of this point is illustrated by a recent case that I presided
over in the Livermore Falls District Court, Docket No. 88-DV-42. The parties were
married for only eight years (and lived together for only six), but their premarital
assets increased in value precipitously during their marriage, so by the time of their
divorce the marital estate was worth, by my rough estimation, about $450,000. The
only issue in the case, other than the divorce itself, was the valuation and division of
marital property. The tracing problems were complex to an extreme, and the attorneys' fees shown by affidavit exceeded $45,000 total-more than 10% of the entire
marital estate. As any practicing attorney knows, the costs of appealing my decision
to the Superior Court and then to the Law Court would have sharply increased those
fees.
108. By my count, the Law Court has decided between 60 and 70 cases involving
the MPA since its adoption. (The figure will vary depending on whether one counts
decisions in which the MPA is only briefly or tangentially discussed. See, e.g., Norton
v. Norton, 443 A.2d 75 (Me. 1982) in which the court upheld, as a matter of trial
court discretion, the trial court's disposition of the marital property.) Of those decisions, only 16 appear to me to contribute significantly to the body of law discussed in
this article: Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d 257 (Me. 1990); Cummings v. Cummings,
540 A.2d 778 (Me. 1988); West v. West, 550 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1988); Bishop v. Bishop,
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mizing that which trial courts across the state are now having to do
anyway virtually every day of the week.
Y,

SEVEN OBJECTIONS To THis PROPOSAL

It is never easy to change eighteen years' worth of statutory interpretation. For one thing, people will object to a new proposal simply
to avoid having to change; for another, there is the insidious assumption that what is tried is true. As I wrote (and rewrote) this
article I naturally kept raising objections to my thesis in an effort
both to anticipate and parry them. Many of those objections I
treated in the body of the text above, or in its accompanying footnotes, but a few I reserved for the end of the article, either because
they did not fit readily into the argument above or because they
deserved special attention. I address them in the order in which they
occurred to me, not in an order that suggests their importance.
1. The interpretationof the MPA proposed here would discourage settlement. This objection seems to be based on the theory that
unpredictability encourages trials and appeals rather than settlements. The objection is flawed for three reasons. First, that which
contributes to the decision to go to trial rather than to settle is far
more complicated than the mere unpredictability of the outcome. It
involves, among other things, the personalities and emotions of the
parties, the personalities and emotions of their attorneys, the reputation and personality of the judge, the nature, value and quantity
of the issues at stake, the cost of the litigation, and the wealth of the
parties. To say that people are more likely to go to trial because the
law is vague or the outcome uncertain is to ignore how complicated
the chemistry of litigation really is.
Second, the objection ignores the fact that the MPA is already
vague and the outcome already largely unpredictable. For reasons
discussed at length above, the meaning of the MPA in many cases
cannot be known until an appeal has been taken; all the interpretation of the MPA urged in this article does is to acknowledge that
uncertainty and to assign it to the forum where it can most quickly,
and least expensively, be resolved.
2. The drafters of the MPA never intended this interpretation.
Who knows what the drafters intended? Did they intend to exclude
541 A.2d 930 (Me. 1988); Macdonald v. Macdonald, 532 A.2d 1046 (Me. 1937);
Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976 (Me. 1984); Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943 (Me.
1984); Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983); Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139 (hie.
1981); Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391 (Me. 1980); Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018
(Me. 1980); Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9 (Me. 1979); Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406
A.2d 70 (Me. 1979); Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152 (Me. 1978); Fournier v. Fournier,
376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977); Young v. Young, 329 A.2d 386 (Me. 1974). Assuming that
this listing is complete (which may be more a function of art than of science), it
involves less than one significant decision per year.
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all wedding gifts from the definition of marital property? Did they
intend to label as a "presumption" that which is not a presumption
at all? Did they intend all of the ambiguities that the Law Court has
so painfully struggled with since the statute's inception? The official
Comment affixed to the original § 307 of the UMDA makes no effort
to define what the phrase "overcome the presumption" means, 10
and the fact that the statute mistakenly refers to a "presumption"
at all suggests that nobody really thought about it."10
And who really cares? Not the Law Court, which in the last ten
years has twice unanimously ignored the plain language of the statute in search of a preferable result."" In fact, the interpretation of
the MPA advanced here requires trial judges faithfully to adhere to
the spirit of the statute when its letter is ambiguous, toward the end
that litigation costs will decline. It is doubtful that any drafter of
the MPA or its predecessor in the Uniform Act can quarrel with
that objective.
3. If this interpretationis such a good idea, why has it not been

adopted elsewhere? The answers are many, and probably none of
them is totally satisfactory.
First, at least one other state with marital property act provisions
similar to Maine's has built into its statute what amounts to a
buffer, giving its trial courts broader discretion and dampening the
necessity for reform. In Minnesota, the legislature added to the Uni109. This is what the Comment to § 307 says, in pertinent part: "A spouse seeking
to overcome the presumption has the burden of proof on the issue of identification.
The presumption is overcome by a showing that the property (1) was acquired prior
to the marriage ... ." HANDaOOK, supra note 15 at 204. The Comment merely parrots the statute, without trying to explain its terms.
110. Nor has the Law Court. See supra text accompanying note 23, discussing
how the court arrived at its present interpretation of the effect of "overcoming" the
presumption.
I have researched high and low for any case law or other authority that closely
analyzes the operation of the MPA's presumption. The only such authority that I
have found is Gregory, supra note 7, at 171: "[The section that established this prosumption also provides for the destruction of the presumption upon a showing that
the property was acquired by devise or in exchange for devised property." Professor
Gregory was discussing Illinois' version of the MPA, which in pertinent part is identical to the MPA. The language that "provides for the destruction of the presumption"
is the phrase "[tihe presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing,"
which is word for word the language of the MPA that this article discusses. When I
first started pondering the MPA, I agreed with Professor Gregory that a showing of a
nonmarital source of property destroyed the presumption, & la Professor Thayer's
famous bursting bubble. See WUNsTmiN's EvDENCE, supra note 31, 301[01], at 3013. However, I then realized that the presumption is no evidentiary presumption at all,
and that it would do more harm than good even to analogize to the operation of
evidentiary presumptions.
111. The decisions to which I refer are Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980)
and Cummings v. Cummings, 540 A.2d 778 (Me. 1988). If you accept my argument
that Dubord v. Dubord is actually an extension of Carter,then that makes three such
decisions in the last 10 years, although Dubord was not decided unanimously.
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form Act's § 307 a provision allowing a trial court to award up to
one-half of one spouse's nomnarital property to the other spouse "to
prevent unfair hardship."11 2 Such a provision allows trial courts to
fudge by softening the hard lines between property over which a
court may exercise discretion and property over which it may not.
Thus there is less pressure on the appellate courts to draw the hard

lines that the Law Court has had to draw, and, ultimately, less incentive to demand a reconsideration of the statute when the lines
are drawn inconsistently.
Second, populous states with statutes like the MPA-such as Illinois-produce such a wealth of appellate law that it is possible to
develop consistent rules for a wide variety of property issues
quickly. Those states do not experience the same delay in the production of appellate rules of interpretation that we do; their many
appellate courts are unravelling the Uniform Act's DNA all the
time. Unfortunately, we in Maine do not enjoy that luxury. We have
few appellate decisions to rely on from within the state and, because
the Law Court has so visibly rejected precedent from other states,113
reliance on foreign precedent is dangerous. Thus the pressure to reform our view of the Uniform Act is different here than elsewhere,
because at the present pace of things it may take decades, if not
generations, to produce a comprehensive and consistent body of
rules for applying the MPA.
Third, the judiciaries of other states that are less populous than
Illinois, and that share our dearth of appellate interpretation of the
Uniform Act, may be less independent-minded than our Law Court,
and more inclined to rely on foreign precedent in formulating their
own rules of interpretation. In those states there is more, reliable
precedent upon which to base decisions at trial level, and hence less
pressure to change how the local version of the Uniform Act is
112. Van de Loo v. Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Min. App. 1934) (quoting
M1NN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982)).
113. InGrant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139, 142 n.2 (Me. 1981), half of the court rejected
as "untenable" a Missouri decision that a gift to both spouses during marriage qualifies under Missouri's version of the Uniform Act § 307 as a gift to "either spouse"
thereby rendering it marital property. (Had the court adopted the Missouri interpretation, it would have avoided the wedding gift problem described in the text above.)
In Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Me. 1983), the entire court rejected Illinois
precedent when it limited transmutation to "documentary transaction[a]." In Cummings, discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 60-65, the court never mentioned Illinois precedent that declared all workers' compensation awards marital
property, whenever received (see supra note 65). And Dubord never even discussed
the following decision from Missouri:
If, during the marriage, a party sells property he owned prior to the marriage and, in addition, sells marital property, and then commingle the proceeds from these sales to purchase new property ... the newly acquired
property so purchased constitutes marital property ....
Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo. App. 1977).
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interpreted.
In the final analysis, however, asking why this interpretation of
our MPA has not surfaced elsewhere may be a bit like asking why, if
peanut butter tastes good, it isn't popular in England. Maine's experience with the MPA is undoubtedly unique, and we may need to
develop unique tools to deal with it.
4. If this interpretationwere adopted, all Law Court precedent
would immediately become obsolete. This contention is untrue; only
Dubord would have to be reconsidered, because it is the only case
that has expressly held that property which derives from one of the
11
statutorily exempted sources must be declared nonmarital. 4
Dubord ought to be reconsidered anyway, so a reassessment of its
treatment of the presumption would amount to no great hardship.
If, on the other hand, stare decisis prohibits that, then the other
obvious approach is to rewrite the statute. I advocate rewriting the
case law only because, as I mentioned above, 115 there is no statutory
amendment on the horizon, but if the MPA were revised and improved as the result of this article I would have accomplished much
of my objective.
5. Judges will be inclined to declare property marital whenever
possible in order to avoid having to trace assets. The Law Court has
recognized that an individual item of property may have both marital and nonmarital characteristics.'" Thus, for example, if a person
owns an antique car before marriage, but after marriage invests
marital funds to have it spruced up, its resulting value is partly marital and partly nonmarital. If prior to divorce the person has sold
the car and bought a boat, the divorce court would have to "trace"
the marital and nonmarital proportions of the car to the boat, in
deciding how much of the value of the boat the court has discretion
1117
to disperse.
Most judges view tracing as a headache, because over the duration
of a long marriage the turnover of assets can be frequent and the
tracing complicated. Yet of greater significance than judges' discomfort is the fact that the tracing of multiple assets through a long
marriage is fertile cause for reversible error. It is easy for a trial
judge, who only hears the testimony once and almost never gets to
contemplate a transcript, to misunderstand the testimony and get
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 106.
116. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979). "Where the marital estate
chooses to invest its funds in certain property together with non-marital funds, the
marital estate is entitled to a proportionate return on its investment. The marital and
non-marital estates have each made investments from which they are entitled to the
full benefit and return." Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
117. This assumes that there was no transmutation of the partly nonmarital asset
into a wholly marital asset. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 75 n.5, for a discussion of the arithmetic of tracing.

1991]

MAINE'S MARITAL PROPERTY ACT

the assets, or the percentages, mixed up. 18 (It is also easy for reasonable people to disagree about how complicated transactions
should be traced.) It would not be surprising if trial judges, faced
with tough tracing problems, took the side exit out by declaring all
the property that would be hard to trace to be marital property.
That would be fine. There is no need to perpetuate a doctrine
that, in complicated cases, invariably produces arguable if not reversible error. In fact, the Law Court adopted the transmutation
doctrine in part to prevent trial courts from having to trace assets.110
Of course, the MPA as interpreted in this article would still produce
tracing problems in cases involving property owned before marriage,
but to the extent that tracing can be diminished litigation is simplified and everybody benefits. Finally, one must keep in mind that a
judge who declares property marital does not thereby withhold it
from the party who has the stronger claim to it. Whether or not a
judge evades the drudgery of tracing, he or she still has the obliga2 0
tion to make a fair distribution of the property.
118. The tracing problem increases if counsel come to trial ill.prepared. Unfortunately, the MPA puts attorneys on the horns of a dilemma prepare well and the
attorney's fees for trial expand exponentially, but the appeal opportunity is reduced;
prepare poorly and the fees remain manageable at trial level, but the chances of confusing the judge and producing an appellate issue rise dramatically. In the case discussed supra at note 107, the attorneys' fees exploded because the attorneys prepared
for trial meticulously;, no appeal was taken.
119. Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1022 (Me. 1980) ("we avoid the illogical and
inequitable results, as well as the complications, application of the 'tracing' doctrine
would produce in situations like that in the case at bar...").
One court simply threw up its hands over the problem. In Ranik v. Ranik, 383
N.W.2d 431 (Minn. App. 1986), the husband complained that the trial court committed error by ignoring case law requiring it to trace the inheritance that he had received during the marriage. Finding no abuse of discretion but without addressing the
merits of the argument, the court simply stated, "[t]he precedential value of comparing the particular facts in one case to the facts in another case is slight at best." Id. at
435. Apparently, the court had no logical answer to the husband's argument, but
wanted to discourage the appeals of tracing issues.
120. In a recent article, Professor Oldham defends retaining the distinction between marital property and separate property-and therefore retaining tracing of assets upon divorce-on three grounds. First, he argues that ab3ent such a distinction,
settlement of cases is discouraged. Second, the distinction is perceived generally as
fair. Third, by maintaining such a distinction the wealthy would be encouraged to
marry-or at least would not be discouraged from marrying-those of leser means.
See Oldham, supra note 69, at 250-51.
I reject the first contention, on the basis of the argument I make in the text in my
discussion of the first of the seven objections to my thesis. I reject the second because
the alternative-a hotchpot of marital property-is not perceived as unfair. I have
never read that transmutation, which shortcircuits the marital-nonmarital property
distinction and obviates tracing, is deemed unfair. In fact, when the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws redrafted Section 307 in 1973 (deleting from it the same provisions
that Maine adopted as our MPA), they adopted two alternative provisions, one of
which creates the hotchpot that Professor Oldham condemns. See Oldham, Tin UNri.
iARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 307 Alternative A, 9A U.LA 238-39 (1973). Finally, I

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:13

6. The proposal in this article does not cure the problem of defining "property".121 That's right. There are no panaceas for a
poorly drafted statute. I propose a cure for those of the MPA's
symptoms that derive from its use of an evidentiary and procedural
misnomer (the "presumption"), and from some of the inadequacy of
its definitions, but I fear that it will take a long time to work all the
kinks out of the statute.
7. This article is an attempt by a trial judge to aggrandize his
power. Living day to day as I do on the front lines, I find it disconcerting not to know where the artillery is pointing most of the time.
Given the inconsistency of the Law Court's aim over the past eighteen years, I think that it would be better to let the troops in the
trenches direct the fire.
XI.

CONCLUSION

At best, the MPA proves that there are no simple answers to complex problems. Unfortunately, the interpretation the Law Court
gives to the MPA forces the court to keep trying to prove that there
are. The court should abandon its search for that holy grail. The
text of the MPA offers us an alternative to the Law Court's current
approach, an approach that cannot reduce the statute's inherent
ambiguities but that can at least reduce litigation costs. To the extent that this statute was a product of the 1970's divorce reform
movement, and to the extent that that movement attempted to facilitate rather than to complicate divorce, 122 the approach suggested

reject Professor Oldham's third argument because I find it less persuasive than the
thesis of "Romeo and Juliet" (love usually conquers all) and because those who do
not share that preference can protect themselves with prenuptial agreements.
121. Under the interpretation suggested by this article, the task of determining
whether something constitutes property at all would remain the difficult task it is
now. See Cummings v. Cummings, 540 A.2d 778 (Me. 1988) (workers' compensation
payments, not claim, are property to be categorized); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d
1290 (Me. 1987) (professional license is not property under ME. R.v. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 722-A (1981)); and Lord v. Lord, 454 A.2d 830 (Me. 1983) (insurance agency
"goodwill" is property). See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
122. See HANDBOOK supra note 15, at 178:
In its provisions on dissolution of marriage, the [Uniform Marriage and
Divorce] Act has totally eliminated the traditional concept that divorce is a
remedy granted to an innocent spouse based on the marital fault of the
other spouse which has not been connived at, colluded in, or condoned by
the innocent spouse. Consideration was given to alternative methods of creating a non-fault device for terminating marriages, including the ground of
voluntary separation for a period of time now recognized by many states.
The Conference came finally to the conclusion ... that the legal dissolution of a marriage should be based solely on a finding that factually the
marriage is irretrievably broken. This standard will redirect the law's attention from an unproductive assignment of blame to a search for the realities
of the marital situation.
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here seems to advance that original objective.123

123. It has been over a year since I began writing this article. During that time
the Family Law Section of the Maine Bar Association has worked faster than L according to a letter I received from Attorney Dana Prescott in early March, 1991, "revision of the Marital Property Statute... will be one of the linchpins of our legislative proposals for the 1992 Legislative Session." By the time I received that
information, it was too late to revise this article to accommodate that fact.
I admit that I wince at the prospect that some of the ideas in my article (the product of many pre-dawn ruminations) may soon become obsolete, but I hope that the
tenor of the article will inspire the Family Law Section, and the Legislature, to accelerate their statutory reforms.

